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Global History and Future World Order 
 
Leonid Grinin, Ilya Ilyin, and Alexey Andreev 
 
 
The present article analyzes the world order in the past, present and future as well 
as the main factors, foundations and ideas underlying the maintaining and change 
of the international and global order. The first two sections investigate the evolu-
tion of the world order starting from the ancient times up to the late twentieth cen-
tury. The third section analyzes the origin and decline of the world order based on 
the American hegemony. The authors reveal the contradictions of the current uni-
polar world and explain in what way globalization has become more profitable for 
the developing countries but not for the developed ones. The authors also explain 
the strengthening belief that the US leading status will inevitably weaken. In this 
connection we discuss the alternatives of the American strategy and the possibility 
of the renaissance of the American leadership. The last section presents a factor 
analysis which allows stating that the world is shifting toward a new balance of 
power and is likely to become the world without a leader. The new world order 
will consist of a number of large blocks, coalitions and countries acting within a 
framework of rules and mutual responsibility. However, the transition to a new 
world order will take certain time (about two decades). This period, which we de-
note as the epoch of new coalitions, will involve a reconfiguration of the World 
System and bring an increasing turbulence and conflict intensity. 
Keywords: world order, American hegemony, global leader, balance of power, 
reconfiguration of the world order. 
Introduction 
Soon after World War I and in connection with the formation of the League of Nations the 
American president Woodrow Wilson coined the term ‘new world order’, hoping that it 
would finally become possible to create a system for maintaining international peace and 
security; meanwhile, the political order had already existed in the Western world for sev-
eral centuries. In historical terms it would be more precise to speak about the international 
order when the European order transformed into the global one. Moreover, prior to the 
European order the inchoate international order could be found in other regions of  
the World System (the most famous here being the Pax Romania). Thus, with respect to 
globalization, the search for the origins of the world order leads back to the ancient times. 
Yet, in historical terms the notion of the world order seems rather amorphous. The human-
ity has passed a long and perilous way to the establishment of certain international rules 
and foundations of co-existence. It is worth analyzing them just in terms of the formation 
(and development) of the world order and the way in which the obtained experience can be 
employed for making predictions on the forthcoming transformations. 
The notions of globalization and world order have become rather closely connected 
today. The countries' mutual influence as well as the impact of global processes on nations 
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and states are evident today (Ilyin and Leonova 2015). Within the political realm globali-
zation considerably affects the transformation of the states' sovereign prerogatives since it 
contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of the states' sovereign powers (Grin-
in 2009, 2012a, 2012b). All this gradually creates the foundations for the world order 
whose outlines (although discussed since the end of the Cold War) are actually just being 
formed. It is obvious that the unfolding globalization cannot but complete with some insti-
tutionalizing of the relations in the foreign policy sphere although this path is difficult and 
ambiguous.  
The present article is devoted to the analysis of the world order and this is appropriate-
ly manifested in its structure. 
Prehistory of the World-order Formation 
Politics as a realm of relations connected with distribution of power (Smelser 1988) seems 
to have appeared around the age of the Upper Paleolithic Revolution. The political sphere 
had started to separate already before the emergence of the state at the level of complex 
societies (see Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Grinin 2012a). Moreover, the foreign policy, 
which implies relations between individual states, is virtually older than the domestic one.1 
However, it is evident that the relations between states could only emerge after a certain 
system of states had been established, and this happened only in the third millennium BC. 
Starting from the third millennium BCE one could observe the upswing and downswing 
cycles of political hegemony (Frank and Gills 1993; see also Chase-Dunn et al. 2010).  
The most famous episodes of the struggle for hegemony in the core of the Afroeurasian 
world-system (in the Near East) are associated with the rises and falls of the Old Babylo-
nian and Old Assyrian Kingdom (the first half of the second millennium BCE),  
a clash between the New Kingdom of Egypt and the Hittite Empire (the second half of the 
second millennium BCE), New Babylonian and Neo-Assyrian Empire (the first half of  
the first millennium BCE). At the time, the region was actually the most advanced (and the 
largest) part of the cultural oecumene. Thus, the clashes within its realm can be considered 
ancestorial for the struggle for the global order. This struggle undoubtedly enhanced  
the links within the World System and supported its unity despite the discord among the 
ancient states (see Andreev, Ilyin, and Zinkina 2015b; Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 
2014b). It also contributed to a quick diffusion of innovations, in particular, of iron metal-
lurgy in the late second and first millennia BCE. Unfortunately, from ancient times until 
the present the violent fights at external arenas remain the triggers for technological ad-
vances.  
The struggle between nomadic and sedentary polities was one of the most important 
phenomena which defined the outlines of the World System political landscape; yet, in the 
present article we will not concern this issue as well as the period of the formation of  
the world empires in the Middle East, and history of the Roman and Chinese Empires 
(Qin, and later Han) (see Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 2014b). It is widely known that by 
the end of the Middle Ages and beginning of the Age of Discoveries (when globalization 
had started its new powerful expansion) the political landscape of the forming World Sys-
tem had experienced numerous transformations. Here one should note that the latter con-
tributed to the initial development of certain ideas, principles, trends, and patterns which 
later would play an important role (and some still remain crucial) in the establishment of 
the global political order. Thus, the comprehension of these phenomena is extremely im-
                                                          
1 War used to be an important element of foreign policy (about primitive warfare see e.g., Keeley 1996). 
Grinin et al. • World Order in the Past, Present, and Future  95
portant for the analysis of the processes under study. First, with respect to long periods of 
time one can hardly ignore the fluctuations connected with the establishment or disrupting 
of a certain balance of power which could launch significant transformations. Such fluctu-
ations are still present.  
One can agree or disagree with Henry Kissinger's statement that the system of power 
balance has hardly ever existed in the human history (Kissinger 1994), but the notion itself 
of the balance of power is extremely significant (and Kissinger pays much attention to it). 
Second, one can distinguish some factors particularly influential for changing the balance. 
Along with the above-mentioned technological factor, the ideological factor also has a 
certain impact. For a long time the struggle for hegemony lacked an ideological constitu-
ent and simply indicated a ruler's success and might.  
Starting from the Greco-Persian wars, there appeared the ideas of confronting between 
Asia and Europe (and of the ideological pattern of the struggle between cultural center and 
barbarian periphery; the latter resembling the ideology of colonialism). In the Middle Ages, 
as a result of contradictions between Islam and Christianity, the ideological factor would 
make an important and permanent contribution to the formation of international order (see 
also below). Even today it persistently shows itself although it is not the primary source of 
conflict in the post-Cold War world, as they often interpret Samuel P. Huntington's ideas 
(1993, 1996). Speaking about ancient and medieval political ideas, one should mark the de-
velopment of the idea of a legitimate political order within a state which can partially ex-
plain foreign policy. These and other principles gradually become institutionalized and dur-
ing the Modern Age they start to form the basis of political order. This allows a more active 
interference into the international political processes which by their nature are weakly sub-
ject to control. And at present this trend is strengthening although with some fluctuations.  
The Age of Discoveries introduced new vectors into the global order. First, the arena 
had actually expanded to a world-wide scale. Second, the started establishment and redis-
tribution of colonial possessions would define the global policy during the following four 
or more centuries. Third, the started formation of the World-System core and periphery 
meant the development of the pattern which is still operating within the current international 
realm. With respect to Europe of the second half of the fifteenth century one can convention-
ally speak about a certain unstable balance after a number of devastating and long-lasting 
wars. However, as a result of the Age of Discoveries and especially of the started Refor-
mation that balance was undermined for more than a century. 
The Creation of the World Order  
The international order as a system of relations and ideas about the foundations that should 
underpin the relations between states and generally in the world, started to form in the six-
teenth century when diplomatic relations were established alongside with future contours of 
the system of ‘great powers’ in Europe. The prototype of legal principles of international 
relation system emerged as a result of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which finished the dev-
astating Thirty Years war in Central Europe. Those principles had been developing for more 
than two hundred years (about the Westphalian system see, e.g., Spruyt 2000). In this respect 
one should mark in the first place the ‘sovereignty’ concept which is manifested both in do-
mestic and foreign policy primarily in the right of war and peace (see Grinin 2012b) and in 
the legitimate supreme power. It came to the forefront after the French revolution in 1789. 
The Thirty Years war was the legacy of the sixteenth-century European tradition of re-
ligious wars. But at the same time, it introduced two new foreign policy principles, which 
later would be actively employed by the politicians, namely: 1) the maintenance of  
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the international ‘balance of power’ through supporting the weaker coalition against the 
stronger one; and 2) the priority of national interests over other (religious, ideological, 
etc.) ones. For example, Richelieu formulated and actively implemented both these ap-
proaches (Kissinger 1994). As a result, although being a catholic state, France supported 
the weaker coalition of the Protestant states in their war against Habsburg Empire that 
strove for the world supremacy. At that time it was the diminished Habsburgs and disunit-
ed Germany which Richelieu (and later Louis XIV) considered as France's major national 
objective which would allow control over tiny German principalities. Given the fact that 
Richelieu was a Catholic cardinal, it was a bold step which had made foreign policy even 
more cynical than before. Since that time one observes a trend when the foreign policy start-
ed to develop according to certain stratagems and principles. 
The Main Factors Influencing the Formation  
of the European/World Order  
As already mentioned, within international relations framework the issue of the balance of 
power and its disruption is crucial for the perception of the states' foreign policy, as well as 
for the general pattern of the European and global relations. Deliberate foreign policy of 
some states (such as France, and later Britain) aimed at creating a number of military-
political alliances enabled them to maintain and control the balance in their favor.2 Bearing 
this in mind, one can better understand the peculiarities of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries' military alliances as well as the reasons of interchanges within them. 
Undoubtedly, it was the geopolitical factor that laid the basis for such an order com-
prising multiple states and several strong powers and lacking a hegemon. In contrast, the 
Chinese geopolitical environment with China (the Celestial Empire) inevitably playing a 
central role in the region hampered the development of modern diplomacy based on a com-
plex system of international relations with almost equal powers. The fundamental principles 
of the Chinese foreign policy evolved around such major issues as the protection of the state 
from the nomads through setting barbarians on each other and launching successful cam-
paigns against nomads, etc. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was the European and not 
the Chinese model of international relations that was to a certain degree expanded to the 
global level. 
The balance between powers could change due to a number of factors, including in-
ternal rebellions, fall of dynasties, etc. Among the long-term factors one should mention 
different growth rates of population, territory, wealth, industry, and commerce.3 But all 
this should be converted into military power. The gunpowder and military revolutions 
(Downing 1992) led to the formation of advanced armies (McNeill 1982), which also con-
tributed to state-building and formation of the new-type states (mature in our terms [see 
Grinin 2012a]). The results of the development of military technologies became evident in 
the course of successful Swedish (in the seventeenth century), Prussian, and Russian  
(in the eighteenth century) military campaigns. For our study, it is of particular importance 
to distinguish the technological innovations convertible into military advantages, because 
this factor became increasingly influential with time. For instance, France and Britain won 
the Crimean war (1853–1856) due to their technological superiority over Russia. 
                                                          
2 This is reflected in Lord Palmerston's claim that England has no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Its interests 
are eternal and perpetual. 
3 Thus, in the sixteenth century the Portuguese and Spanish came to the front after their colonial success and enormous 
wealth got from there while similar discoveries caused a gradual decline of the Italian trading states. 
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With the emergence of large-scale armies and completed transition to industrial produc-
tion principle (Grinin 2007) the state's overall economic power and supply with resources 
became the main determining factor. It was the total economic power of the anti-German 
coalition that led to Germany's defeat in both World Wars. Nowadays, different economic 
(and financial) indicators can help to define the trends of shifting balance of power. 
Finally, the balance of power could be significantly although irregularly disrupted by a 
changing ideological paradigm. Since the latter significantly changed the perception  
of legitimacy of government and its actions, it also inevitably led to the exacerbation of in-
ternational relations and wars between ideological enemies. The results of such violations 
manifested in the Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious wars and 
later in the division of Europe into the Protestants and Catholics. The French Revolution  
(in the late eighteenth century) caused a new ideological crisis which undermined the sancti-
ty of monarchy and aristocracy. 
This was followed by a quarter-of-a-century-long chain of endless wars, coalitions, the 
triumph and fall of Napoleon's Empire and restoration of monarchies. The new ideological 
turn began after the First World War as a result of the deep crisis of the world order, and 
after the Second World War the ideological gap between socialism and capitalism became 
a determining factor for the new world order. 
Although the performed factor analysis of the establishment and changes in the world 
order is far from being complete, it can explain the causes and results of the evolution of 
the world order, and can be employed to make predictions on the directions of the future 
world order development. 
From a Concert of Europe to the World Wars 
The concert of great powers existed from the seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century and 
according to Kissinger, it was a model of the world order which to some extent remains 
relevant even today (Kissinger 1994, 2014). Of course, the powers in the list alternated, 
and each change was associated with the shifts in the established world order. In the sev-
enteenth century, Sweden could have gained the ‘great power’ status if not for  
the defeat in the Great Northern War with Russia, while Russia, on the contrary, joined  
the ‘great powers concert’. Prussia joined this ‘club’ under Frederick II the Great in the 
eighteenth century. Then, the number of the great European powers remained the same 
(five – France, England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia) for about a century, until the unifi-
cation of Germany and Italy, and later the rise of the USA and Japan. The shift in  
the European balance of power occurred mainly due to (a) a successful public administra-
tion reform and army reorganizations (Russia and Prussia in the eighteenth century are 
good examples here); (b) growing trade flows and wealth; and (c) a breakthrough in tech-
no-economic sphere (made, e.g., by Britain as a result of the so-called Agrarian revolution 
and the final phase of the Industrial revolution in the eighteenth century). Thus, in the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century it was Britain that controlled the balance of power in 
Europe, uniting in different alliance and joining or destroying coalitions. Meanwhile, the lag 
in socio-political transformations caused the decline of the former leading powers like Spain 
and Portugal, and left Genoa and Venice on the sidelines. The Austrian Empire and France 
had also considerably lost their positions; and the technological backwardness of Holland, 
which used to be ‘favorite’ in the seventeenth century (Arrighi 1994), together with its 
defeat in the war, led to the loss of political status. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 and the Holy Alliance of the Russian, Austrian, 
and Prussian monarchs were significant thresholds in the development of principles and 
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forms of control over international relations. The monarchs sought to maintain Europe's 
status quo and cooperated to undermine revolutions. This new ideological turn marked a 
return to the principle of legitimate (monarchical) power. Then, the concept and an effective 
system of the ‘concert of Europe’ emerged which involved the above-mentioned five great 
powers and was designated to maintain equilibrium and balance of power and to escape 
wars.4 It implied a multilateral diplomacy and opportunities of regular international confer-
ences and existed until the Crimean war of 1853. 
The increasing colonial activity involved the Asian countries (China, Japan, Burma, 
etc.) into the global affairs; meanwhile, many new states emerged in Latin America. That 
was the way how the world order originated with Europe still remaining the main arena. 
The desire to preserve legitimate governments persisted in the European policy for 
three decades, at times running counter the countries' national interests. However, the revo-
lutionary wave of 1848–1849, industrialization in Europe and the change of regime in France 
had undermined this ideology. It was replaced by a much more direct and cynical one, associ-
ated with political maneuvering in search for a combination of alliances, which would allow 
getting profits regardless the ideological proximity or dislikes. In Bismarck's Germany, this 
policy was called ‘Realpolitik’. This disappearance of the ideological bias explains to a cer-
tain extent the existence of various and rather unstable alliances and coalitions of the great 
powers in the period between the 1870s and early 1900s. Generally recognized as a master 
of combinations and compromises, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initiated the 
creation of such unions. 
As to the causes of tensions and conflicts between powers, they were mostly observed 
at the final stage of the division of colonial possessions and spheres of influence. 
The German Confederation was established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (to re-
place the Holy Roman Empire destroyed by Napoleon). Although the number of German 
States reduced from three hundred to three dozens, Central Europe generally remained 
weak. Meanwhile, this was considered an essential part of the balance of power and such 
situation with Germany was the major objective of the national policy of France, Britain, 
and other powers. The rivalry for the influence in this part of Germany determined the 
policy of Prussia and Austria. 
That is why the unification of Germany under the Prussian rule became the major 
change in Europe of the early 1870s, resulting from several victorious wars, Bismarck's 
shrewd policy and a number of mistakes made by Austria and France. This drastically 
changed the balance of power, since in the center of Europe a new state emerged which 
was stronger than any other power in Europe. Thus, France got an urgent necessity to find 
an ally, since after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war it dreamed of revenge, but re-
mained weaker than Germany. Bismarck in his turn was afraid of the war on two fronts, 
and therefore sought an alliance with Russia. But finally, after Bismarck's resignation, the 
conflict between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans led to the Dual 
Alliance (1892) signed by Russia and France against Germany, and then there was the 
agreement between France and Britain (the Entente cordiale) in 1904 which transformed into 
triple Entente with Russia in 1907. Germany's military and economic strengthening made 
Britain take its favorite strategy of joining the less powerful group in order to weaken the 
leading continental power that is Germany. The rapid industrial development in all coun-
tries, the explosive technological innovations, a considerable change of war means – all 
                                                          
4 One should note here that since the contemporary world divergence from the unipolarity, it is rather probable that the 
future world system will be a kind of such ‘concert’ of some leading coalitions. 
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these pushed rivals (especially Germany) to change the balance of power by means of a 
military victory. 
From the Balance of Power to Bipolarity 
Thus, the new military-political alliances emerged in Europe and divided it into two op-
posing blocks. Eventually, this led to the First World War, which changed the global polit-
ical landscape and the balance of power. Then, there was established the first international 
institution – the League of Nations – which attempted to influence the formation of new 
principles of international relations, and besides, the system of international conventions 
continued to develop. Nevertheless, after the World War II the new stable world order had 
existed for quite a short period. The powerful changes that occurred, including the emer-
gence of the USSR, the development of new weapons and the great depression, the reluc-
tance of Germany to recognize the imposed limits and other factors exacerbated the rela-
tions and unleashed another war. 
The order established after World War II differed significantly from the previously ex-
isting one. First, there were only two strong powers (the USA and the USSR), in other 
words, the world became bipolar with two military blocks (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization). The military core of this balance was nuclear equations and deterrence 
strategy. Secondly, it was based on ideological foundations which the previous world or-
der had lacked. It is possible that it was ideological bias that supported a rather long exist-
ence of the post-war world order. 
Generally speaking, a stable world order recognized and supported by the leading ac-
tors usually endured from three to four decades, or even less. Thus, the system that had 
existed before the French revolution (1789) had worked for less than 30 years. It was es-
tablished after the Seven Years' War (i.e., after 1763) and destroyed in 1790–1791.  
The Order established after the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna was de-
stroyed by the revolutions of 1848–1849 and the Crimean war, and had existed for less 
than thirty-five years. The subsequent system of world order began to form after the emer-
gence of the German Empire (1871), but developed only by the early 1890s and was de-
stroyed by the First World War; therefore it endured for less than two decades.  
The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was violated by Germany in 1935. Thus, the world order 
established after the Second World War existed from 1945 to 1990 that is for 45 years, and 
that was an achievement. 
The Issues of the Current World Order  
The late twentieth-century shift to Pax Americana.  
Globalization and the crisis of the onipolar world 
The collapse of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union destroyed the previous bipolar world 
order and led to the establishment of a unipolar world. Obviously, the ideas about the new 
world order that began to develop right in the late 1980s and early 1990s, often reflected 
the belief in the absolute domination of the Western economies, institutions and ideas (see, 
e.g., Attali 1991) and became almost synonymous to the idea of Pax Americana (see, e.g., 
Brzezinski 1998). Thus, Henry Kissinger's views (Kissinger 1994, 2001) on the new bal-
ance of power were no exception.  
However, while the unipolar order was formed and developed the world balance shift-
ed once again. This was caused by the countries' uneven economic and technological devel-
opment. Over the last three or four decades, globalization has been constantly and signifi-
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cantly effecting the changes in the world order. It eventually shifted the balance of economic 
power towards the developing world. One of the main reasons was the so-called ‘deindustri-
alization’ which meant a transition of a significant part of production, economy and technol-
ogy from developed to developing countries (for more details see Grinin and Korotayev 
2014a, 2015). The result is the Western countries' weakening economic growth and their 
diminishing role in the global arena, while the rest of the world (developing countries) in-
creases the influence (see Fig. 1). 
Thus, during the two decades starting from 1991, at the background of weakening Eu-
rope and continuing stagnation in Japan one observed the rise of economic giants in Asia 
(China and India) as well as the emergence of a number of rapidly developing states (from 
Mexico to Malaysia and Ethiopia) which preserve their growth rates (although with some 
difficulties) and are likely to take the leading positions in the world in the quite nearest 
future. 
 
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the share of the West and the rest of the world (‘the Rest’) in 
the global GDP after 1980 (based on the World Bank data on the GDP calcu-
lated in 2005 purchasing power parity international dollars) 
Source: World Bank 2014: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD (Grinin and Korotayev 2015). 
World order in the past, present and future 
The decline of the American and Western leadership. Is the revival possible? By the 
1990s, the USA, unlike the former world leaders, had concentrated a wide range of leader-
ship aspects: from technological, financial and military to scientific and cultural. That was 
the first (and probably, the last) case in world history. But in 2001, being at the peak of 
their might, the USA was stricken by unexpected 9/11 events. That was a turning point 
after which many characteristics and patterns of domestic and foreign policy have become 
excessive. The USA abandons their own principles of freedom and start surveillance over 
their own citizens, as well as the leaders and population of other countries. It starts to ig-
nore the international law and principle of sovereignty (Herland 2014).  
Pretty soon, during the financial and economic crisis of 2006–2010, it became quite 
evident that the USA had been losing their leading positions. However, the talks about an 
inevitable decline of the American might began already in the 1970–1980s (see, e.g., Vo-
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gel 1979; Kennedy 1987). Since the 1990s, one observes an increasing number of political 
forecasts predicting an imminent decline of the American supremacy and simultaneous 
coming to the front of Asian economies (Attali 1991; Colson and Eckerd 1991; Arrighi 
1994; Frank 1997; Buchanan 2002; Kupchan 2002; Todd 2003; Wallerstein 2003; Man-
delbaum 2005; NIC 2008, 2012; see also: Grinin 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 
2010b, 2015). The increasing negative phenomena in America at the background of the 
Asian countries' success, made the idea of the American decline more feasible, causing 
either a feeling of triumph or a concern depending on one's preferences. Since 2008, there 
have appeared more publications arguing that America's power is decreasing, that it is no 
longer an absolute leader and that the unipolar world is being transformed, etc. (see, e.g., 
Milne 2008; Zakaria 2008; Haass 2008). Many of such articles had rather striking head-
lines, for instance: ‘America's Fall is a Dangerous Opportunity for its Enemies’ (Tisdall 
2008); ‘America's Power Cracks and is Broken into Pieces’ (Gray 2008); ‘Sun Setting on 
the American Century’ (Reid 2008); ‘Is it the End of the American Era?’ (Kennedy 2008). 
Such articles appeared and still appear on a rather regular basis (see, e.g., Bremmer 2015; 
Klare 2015). Sooner or later the United States of America will no longer be able to lead 
the world in its common way, and it can result in a drastic change of the geopolitical land-
scape (for more details see Grinin 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 
2010b, 2011, 2015). 
In 2008, Farid Zakaria, a famous political expert and editor of the Newsweek Interna-
tional, called for the USA to become a global mediator and develop, in cooperation with 
other countries, new rules for the world order. He wrote that the USA had two alternatives. 
Either it can reinforce the existing world order via cooperation with new great powers. 
However, it should compromise on some of its power and privileges, and agree that future 
world will have variety of opinions and different points of view. Otherwise, America may 
just passively observe how ‘the rise of the rest’ will rip to shreds of the world order that 
have been built for the latest 60 years (Zakaria 2008). But he was wrong. The USA, hav-
ing hardly recovered from the crisis, chose the third way – to undermine the power of its 
competitors and thus, preserve their position of the only superpower in the world. These 
‘efforts’ have been increasing turbulence in the world in recent years (Heuvel 2015). All 
this means that we will face much more difficulties than we could on the way to a new 
world order (not American), which will be established sooner or later.  
But still the question of whether the ‘sunset’ of the USA can probably turn into its 
new ‘sunrise’ remains open for discussions because many Americans will hardly put up 
with such a situation. That is why it is worth considering the arguments of those who be-
lieve that the USA can restore its power again.  
First of all, the stabilization of the American economy after the crisis supports the ide-
as that the American age will last a long way down the road. Also, many people hope for a 
technological or other miracle which will revive the American power, or for the US ability 
to control the rivals (see also Milne 2008; Kennedy 2008; Bremmer 2015). Technology, as 
well as a breakthrough in innovations, has quite a strong influence on changing the power 
balance and formation of a new balance. We have already stated our hypotheses that a new 
powerful technological wave will start in the 2030–2040s (see Grinin 2007; Grinin A. and 
Grinin L. 2015). The model of the new world order will strongly depend on who will lead 
this new technological pattern, especially if these innovations are converted into the mili-
tary supremacy. Today's developing world invests more and more into technology and has 
achieved much in some spheres – for example, India is the world leader in Earth's remote 
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sensing. Quite recently, it has become the first to put a satellite into orbit, which is created 
for stereo photography of the Earth surface at the height of 618 kilometers.  
But it is quite clear that the USA holds the leading position as a claimant upon this 
technological lead, and thus it has an opportunity to preserve its world leadership. Moreo-
ver, today the USA has much more financial resources for this,5 not mentioning the re-
maining control over the global financial and information flows. There is, however, an 
important trend that should be marked out. During the last decades the American transna-
tional corporations have shown more and more separation from the native state, where 
they feel cramped, thus involuntarily playing into the hands of developing countries.  
The USA's new economic partnerships (see below) can strengthen this trend, which is a 
great deal. The same way, the English technology and funds caused the rise of the USA, 
India, Canada, and Australia in the nineteenth century, while Britain itself ceased to be the 
world leader.  
On the one hand, the world financial elite has become quite mobile, and the world be-
comes global and ‘digitalized’ to the extent that boarders and territories will be of no ac-
count for big money and its owners. So it seems that one more reset of the world order will 
hardly destabilize the position of the World-System center. But on the other hand, if the 
companies are predominantly active outside the USA, then the American population can 
get poorer, and while the inequality in the country is growing, the internal social tension 
can increase.  
On the one hand, the US population is getting older, and very soon white population 
among young people will be overgrown by the non-white. All this may aggravate social 
conflicts. On the other hand, the USA is still attractive for immigrants, which bring human 
capital of high quality to the country (scientists, analysts, and engineers). In short, the pro-
cesses will be rather complicated, and as any future processes, they may reveal quite unex-
pected phenomena. 
Problems of the decline of the American leadership with regard to the 
World System and thes of the ‘global disorder’ 
The burden of the only superpower turns out to be beyond America's strength (Klare 
2015). It should be taken into account that the USA will face not only other nations' wish-
es but also regional and sometimes world-scale interests. One can hardly admit that the 
USA interests are the interests of the world; besides, it is inconceivable to carry this bur-
den of a superpower for indeterminate amount of time, interfering into everything. It is no 
wonder that even claims for this are becoming overwhelming and the reaction to the lack 
of power – more and more nervous.  
At the same time, some political analysts and economists' hopes for a prompt and ava-
lanching failure of the USA are groundless: it probably will proceed gradually while ob-
jective circumstances, including the growth of peripheral countries, promote it. As the 
connoisseur of great powers, Paul Kennedy notes this departure will be long (Kennedy 
                                                          
5 In spite of the fact, that many developing countries headed by China quite confidently catch up with the USA in 
the number (but not in the quality) of scientific publications in Scopus and Web of Science, an overwhelming part 
of the market of patents and technology selling belongs to the developed countries, with the USA having a one-
third of the sales volume of licenses on technology. ‘The transfer of technology to foreign countries brings big 
revenues to the USA, exceeding in volume the cash inflow of all other countries-exporters of scientific and tech-
nological knowledge’ (Zimenkov 2014). 
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2008; see also: NIC 2008; Zakaria 2008). Besides, we should note that the world is still 
interested in the US leadership (see, e.g., Barber 2014).  
Indeed, the weakening of the US leadership brings a bunch of problems with it. It is 
widely suggested that the USA place will be occupied by the EU, China or someone else 
(from India to Russia; more often they talk about China). But it is a big mistake, as it will 
not be just a simple change of the leader.6 When the USA loses its status of the leader, it 
will lead to the fundamental change of the whole structure of the world economic and po-
litical order, as the USA concentrates too many aspects of the leadership. It means that the 
USA's position in the World-System will remain the same since no other country is able to 
concentrate as many leader's functions simultaneously. And that is why (as well as consid-
ering many other reasons) when the USA loses the leadership position, it means a deep 
and rather difficult and critical transformation of the World-System itself, when even the 
nearest consequences are quite unclear (for more details see Grinin 2009, 2011, 2013; Grinin 
and Korotayev 2010b, 2014a, 2015). That is why it is necessary to analyze the whole range 
of consequences.  
Thus, according to some analysts, the unipolar period is close to its end today. How-
ever, it has not yet been replaced by a new global order, since there are multiple opposing 
principles that operate in the world today and thus, it looks more like a disorder  
(Le Monde 2008). This disorder is supported by the activities of many, if not all global 
players, but in recent years a considerable disorder has been particularly caused by the US 
actions, which is not surprising. On the one hand, the USA declines without being substi-
tuted by any equivalent leader. Moreover, there is an ever-growing number of supporters 
of reducing the US presence in the world in the very United States (see Bremmer 2015; 
Heuvel 2015). On the other hand, the United States still has power which allows preserv-
ing its position in the world. However, the hegemon's clumsy actions evoke opposition in 
many countries worldwide. On the whole, the decline of the US leading positions together 
with the attempts of a number of states to change the global rules (e.g., in relation to the 
dollar's status, etc.), as well as America's absolute unwillingness to concede any of its in-
formal prerogatives, increase tensions in the world.  
The Prolegomena to the Outlines of the New World Order  
The need for a new order, problems of the transition period  
and the balance of power 
Our assumptions about the principles of a new world order are based on the following 
findings. First, no hegemon has the same range of leadership benefits as the United States 
to replace it today (for more details, see Grinin 2011, 2012a, 2012b). Second, the weaken-
ing of the US leadership is inevitable and becomes more and more noticeable. However, 
the US will preserve a number of advantages for a long time (see e.g., Bremmer 2015; Za-
karia 2008). Third, the world is to some extent interested in the American soft leadership but 
without dictatorial ambitions to undermine the opponents' power. Fourth, the transition to  
                                                          
6 About the Chinese economic, environmental and population problems, which can prevent its further economic expan-
sion see Grinin 2011, 2013; Grinin, Tsirel, and Korotayev 2014. We should note that despite the enormous progress, 
China still lags behind not only the USA, but also Russia (e.g., the PRC space program has been largely ‘copied’ 
from the Soviet one) in the most advanced technological areas, as well as in the military sphere. China's falling into 
Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap is also evident. And the way out could be delayed since their causes 
are fundamental and hard to overcome for any country of the geopolitical Onshore, including all of the BRICS coun-
tries. 
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a new world order requires a random search for forms, principles, and conditions to create 
precedents and the desired combinations. Therefore, it will be a long and difficult search. 
Fifth, the transition to the new world order will temporarily increase turbulence and strife, as 
well as the lack of stability and struggle between different patterns of the new order. 
Thus, today there are ever clearly visible trends towards the fact that the new world 
order will be different, it will be the world without hegemon but with some centers of 
power and influence, among which the United States is likely to be the most important. 
But it can only claim the title of the ‘first among equals’, rather than the title of superpow-
er and hegemon (NIC 2008). Accordingly, one can suggest the following two scenarios  
of the US withdrawal: 1) meaningful and the most profitable path of a new world order in 
the long-term with maximum possible preservation of its influence, but not a dictate; and 
2) a bitter struggle of the United States to maintain the status quo, including various actions 
to undermine and weaken the opponents. This will inevitably create permanent tension and 
strife. Meanwhile, the United States seems to choose the second pattern (although a big de-
lay of another economic crisis could make them resort to the first one). But even when fol-
lowing the second path the United States will be increasingly forced to seek new alliances 
and allies.7 Anyway, it is the struggle for the American hegemony and its position in relation 
to the large and fast-growing countries that keep the main intrigue of the contemporary glob-
al contradiction.  
Why is the increasing ‘disorder’ more probable, if not inevitable, than a smooth transi-
tion? First of all, a move towards a new order requires common wisdom and compromise, 
but this is particularly so with the United States. But the political elite have always lacked 
wisdom. However, there are also deeper reasons. The revolutionary change in the global 
balance of economic power which we mentioned above (see Fig. 1) creates objective con-
ditions for the revision of the existing world order. However, it does not entail an automat-
ic change in military and political balances. Figuratively speaking, this requires pulling the 
political component of global change (political globalization) to the economic one (for 
definitions and paradigms of globalization, see Andreev, Ilyin, and Zinkina 2015a). Obvi-
ously, the latter is far ahead of the former. And further development would be difficult 
without such pulling. Yet, the narrowing of the gap between economic and political glob-
alization is inevitable and we denote this process as a reconfiguration of the World System 
(see Grinin 2013; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). 
The major vectors of this reconfiguration include weakening of the former core of the 
World System (the USA and the West), and simultaneous strengthening of the positions of 
a number of peripheral countries and generally increasing role of the developing countries. 
However, one should bear in mind that the ‘catching up’ (between the political and eco-
nomic components of globalization) will also bring severe political and geopolitical crises 
in different regions. Elsewhere we have considered the crises and turmoils in the Middle 
                                                          
7 In October 2015, the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact was announced. Also, the negotiations 
are going on with respect to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA). Their implementation (although the recent signing of two agreements, as well as the ratification 
and operation of the former remain rather doubtful) will mean significant changes and aggravation of economic 
struggle. After all, all these economic alliances combined can represent two-thirds of the world GDP (at face value). 
Thus, the United States put at stake their domination in major economic associations. However, we agree with some 
observers (e.g., Hedges 2015) that these agreements would be more profitable for the American TNCs than for the 
US economy in general. On the contrary, the latter may weaken due to the expanded import and further transfer of 
the US production abroad. 
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East after 2010, as well as the Ukrainian crisis as both ‘reconfiguring’ and geopolitical 
crises which require transformations in the world order. At the same time, grave and prob-
ably unexpected crises in other societies or regions seem rather possible. The abruptness 
may be akin to earthquakes. And if to continue the geological metaphor, one should note 
that just like the tectonic shifts occur under the most mobile Earth's crust and at the bound-
aries of tectonic plates, the reconfiguring crises occur in the least stable regions and socie-
ties which are situated at the junction of geopolitical ‘plates.’ Both the Middle East and the 
Ukraine are the regions of this kind.8 
We also argue that stability or instability of the world order depends on the stable or 
mobile character of the balance of power. The current balance of power obviously under-
goes some transformations. If the idea of the weakening United State is right, what would 
be the shift towards a new balance? We assume that one of probable scenarios is the crea-
tion of various alliances between countries to strengthen their positions and increase op-
portunities. As we have seen, this process has even involved the United States, who is usu-
ally reluctant in taking over different commitments. Thus, the search for a new balance of 
power has already started and it will be manifested in a more active creation of various 
alliances and coalitions of countries and their associations. We denote this process as an 
epoch of new coalitions (Grinin 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2013; Grinin and Korotayev 2010b; 
2011, 2012, 2014a, 2015).  
We can find similar ideas in some other analysts' works (e.g., Bremmer 2015). Thus, 
for example, Michael Klare suggests quite a pragmatic scenario. In his opinion, one should 
accept the obvious facts on the ground that the United States shares the planet with other 
major powers: none matches the power of the United States, and is weak enough to be in-
timidated by the threat of the US military intervention. Having taken a more realistic as-
sessment of the US opportunities, Washington should focus on how to co-exist with such 
powers as Russia, Iran and China, and how to settle the differences with them without in-
creasing tension (Klare 2015).  
The Epoch of New Coalitions and the Outlines  
of the New World Order 
Thus, the search for a new balance has brought us to the period which we call the epoch of 
new coalitions. The alliances can emerge accidentally and due to unexpected reasons 
which can be exemplified by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). 
First introduced in 2001 by an American analyst Jim O'Neil as an appropriate acronym, 
BRICS during the last six years has become quite a real, dynamic, and multilinear alliance.  
It is the most important strategic direction of the Russian foreign policy, and its 
hope for an alternative center of power. Within the BRICS framework trade with 
the partners tends to increase, and China plays especially important role in this 
regard. Unfortunately, there is an insufficient cooperation between the BRICS 
partners in cultural, scientific, educational and technological spheres; also  
the member-states' intellectual influence on the global processes is far from the 
American influence. To implement the idea of the rise of BRICS and related de-
                                                          
8 The societies found to be at the intersection are situated in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Western China (Ti-
bet and Xiang Jiang), West Africa (at the intersection of Islamic and Tropical Africa), and in some regions of South 
America. These regions are quite unstable, with already manifested occasional or possible signs of a crisis (but this 
does not necessarily mean that it will take place). 
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veloping countries (recently introduced by a group of the Russian scholars; see 
Sadovnichiy, Yakovetz, and Akaev 2014), there should be developed an ideolo-
gy which will attract ‘intellectual masses.’ This has been the case with the coun-
tries which had been leaders for long periods of time. But there are no attractive 
ideas about it yet. The communist ideology underpinning the rise of the USSR 
and still implemented in China is outdated. The noospheric and humanistic ideas 
developed by the Russian scientific school (and perceived with interest in China 
and India) still lacks romanticism that can drive the masses. Therefore, the de-
velopment of such an ideology as well as setting the leadership objectives and 
movement to the projected goals remains an urgent task for the BRICS group. An 
effective solution of the problems can consist in a complex methodology which 
should include global and regional forecasting and defining the dynamics of inter-
connected world and regional development; understanding of globalization and ac-
companying transformation of the world order as objective processes that can be 
controlled. It also implies mathematical modelling to define an optimal world order 
based on sustainable development. Such an interdisciplinary approach is fully em-
ployed in the project in which the authors of the present article participate and 
which is aimed at revealing a reasonable alternative to the current world order al-
so within the common global trend of the BRICS rise. 
Thus, we see that the Earth has become rather tightly connected for cooperation even 
at a distance. Thus, there appear different geopolitical fantasies, some of which are likely 
to come true as it happened with BRICS. However, the flexibility of partnerships within 
the World-System framework will probably increase for some time, but some of the 
emerging alliances and coalitions can turn chimeric, ephemeral or fantastic. 
The above-mentioned coming turbulence together with the formation of different alli-
ances and combinations may last for some time. But along with probable increase of con-
flicts and political transformations in different regions there will increase the vector aimed 
at the formation of common frame for the states' interests. We hope that after a certain pe-
riod of ‘the game without rules’ (during one or two decades) the global arena will never-
theless be considered as a common field of interests with acceptable and profitable rules of 
the game for everyone to follow. The completed catching up of the political component  
of globalization can create a trend when more and more states will start to develop their 
policy with the account of global interests. 
Certainly, the above-mentioned ideas can seem utopian especially because of the self-
centered approaches and double standards that have recently intensified. But probably this 
shows that the world is in the search for the foundations of a new world order. Probably,  
this will require passing through certain cataclysms (e.g., new economic crisis) since just  
the critical events bring dramatic changes. 
The search for the most stable, advantageous and appropriate supranational organiza-
tional forms can bring to life different and rapidly changing intermediate forms, while the 
players at the global and regional stages will search for more effective and convenient coa-
litions and agreements. But finally, some of the new alliances and coalitions will transform 
from temporary into permanent ones and become effective supranational forms. During 
this process some new norms of international law will be developed whose necessity has 
already been much spoken about for some decades.  
Thus, the foundations of the future world order must undergo certain transformations. 
Besides, the countries that continue to roughly and selfishly defend their national interests 
Grinin et al. • World Order in the Past, Present, and Future  107
will lose in the final count. The largest states' policy aimed at their forceful global and re-
gional dominance (including the most independent and selfish sovereign – the USA) will 
also undergo radical changes. The national selfishness will hardly disappear; however, any 
international action should be both relevant and ideologically justified. That is why there is 
a hope and perception that the concept of foreign policy will change and there will gradually 
increase the claims for common (regional, world, and group) well-being; yet, the formula-
tions like ‘the best representative of the world interests’ can often conceal selfish goals. But 
anyway such transformation will lead to significant and mostly positive changes. 
The new world order will call for: 1) a rather solid balance of power and interests;  
2) new models of the supranational government and coordination of the global processes; 
and 3) new ideologies. To solve the first task one should recognize the principle of plural-
ism of political regimes when any regime (including the democratic one) has its advantages 
and drawbacks. The refusal from imposing democracy at all accounts can become a crucial 
constituent in creating a common frame of interests and rules. To solve the second task one 
should reject the idea of the universal democracy at all levels. The European Union's experi-
ence has shown that at the supranational scale the democratic procedures work rather im-
properly. Thus, one needs a comprehensive search for new patterns which would lack an 
ideological bias. Perhaps, here one could employ international expert organizations co-opted 
by different countries and coalitions as well as a certain quota system for them at the interna-
tional level. As for a universal ideology, it seems it can emerge only on the basis of the 
search for new cooperation patterns. 
Thus, although we anticipate rather turbulent times of an emerging balance between 
different countries and coalitions, the humanity will have rather good chances to use glob-
alization to create the foundations of the new world order. 
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